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Abstract. Recent seismic event worldwide proved how fragile the electric pow-
er system can be to seismic events. Decision Support Systems (DSSs) could 
have a critical role in assessing the seismic risk of electric power networks and 
in enabling asset managers to test the effectiveness of alternative mitigation 
strategies and investments on resilience. This paper exemplifies the potentiali-
ties of CIPCast, a DSS recently created in the framework of the EU-funded pro-
ject CIPRNet, to perform such tasks. CIPCast enables to perform risk assess-
ment for Critical Infrastructures (CI) when subjected different natural hazards, 
including earthquakes. An ad-hoc customization of CIPCast for the seismic risk 
analysis and management of electric power networks is featured in this paper. 
The international literature describes effective and sound efforts towards the 
creation of software platforms and frameworks for the assessment of seismic 
risk of electric power networks. None of them, unfortunately, achieved the goal 
of creating a user-friendly and ready available DDS to be used by asset manag-
ers, local authorities and civil protection departments. Towards that and build-
ing on the international literature, the paper describes metrics and methods to be 
integrated within CIPCast for assessing the earthquake-induced physical and 
functional impacts of the electric power network at component and system lev-
el. The paper describes also how CIPCast can inform the service restoration 
process.  
Keywords: Decision Support System (DSS), Damage Scenario, Seismic Risk, 
Electric Power system, Resilience, Decision Making Processes. 
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1 Introduction 
Critical Infrastructures (CI) such as electrical grids, gas, water, telecommunication, 
roads, and railways networks are technological systems the correct functioning of 
which might impact on the life quality of citizens. CI protection is needed to guaran-
tee the physical integrity of CI and the continuity of the services that they deliver. In 
particular, recent seismic event worldwide proved how fragile the electric power sys-
tem can be to seismic events and similarly the critical importance of guaranteeing the 
functionality of the electric power service to support emergency management, recov-
ery operations and the daily life of the affected communities. In the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake, for example, all of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power’s 
(LADWP’s) 1.5 million power customers lost service, many for a week or more [1]. 
The 22nd February 2011 Christchurch, New Zealand, earthquake caused an estimated 
629 million customer minutes of outages [2] that, in-turn, induced consequences on 
the functionality of the local telecommunication and waste networks. The impact 
could have been much worst. In fact, most of the power outages were caused by lique-
faction damage to cables while above-ground components, including overhead lines 
and substations performed well, thanks to a seismic upgrade program that was imple-
mented few years before the earthquake [3].  
During the emergency and recovery phases, the local asset managers expressed the 
need and wish to perform scenario analysis [4] aiming to: compare alternative re-
pair/reconstruction strategies; asses risks to mitigate risks, with a multi-hazard per-
spective; support the business case for investing into resilience. Decision Support 
Systems (DSSs) could have a critical role in assessing the seismic risk of electric 
power networks and in enabling asset managers to test the effectiveness of alternative 
mitigation strategies and to support business cases for investing into the resilience 
enhancement of the network.  
The international literature describes effective and sound efforts towards the crea-
tion of software platforms and frameworks for the assessment of seismic risk of elec-
tric power networks. None of them, unfortunately, achieved the goal of creating a 
user-friendly and ready available DDS to be used by asset managers, local authorities 
and civil protection departments. Just to provide some examples (an exhaustive litera-
ture review is out of the scope of the paper) the American Lifeline Alliance, ALA, 
defined guidelines and accompanying commentaries [5] to provide a multilevel pro-
cess by which the performance of electric power system in natural hazards and human 
threat events could be assessed. The HAZUS platform [6], developed in USA for 
estimating risks from natural hazards on the built-environment included: a) fragility 
curves for different components of electric power networks (i.e. substations, genera-
tion plants, and distribution circuits) giving the probability of reaching or exceeding 
four levels of damage, for a given level of ground motion; b) a simplified methodolo-
gy for assessing the residual system performance in term of a probabilistic estimation 
of power outages; c) functionality restoration curves for electric substations and dis-
tribution circuits and for generation facilities, based on [7]. After that, an attempt to 
advance the modelling of the post-earthquake restoration processes for electric power 
networks was made by [8], that proposed discrete event simulation models to estimate 
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geographically-disaggregated, quantitative restoration curves, including an explicit 
representations of the company’s decision variables (e.g. repair crews and material 
available, etc.). 
Finally, in Europe, the EU-funded Syner-G project, developed an integrated meth-
odology and a software tool, referred to as OOFIM Object-Oriented Framework for 
Infrastructure Modelling and Simulation [9, 10] for the systemic seismic vulnerability 
and risk assessment of complex systems, including electric power networks. Syner-G 
compared and selected models for the seismic vulnerability assessment of electric 
power networks’ components [11] and implemented the OOFIM tool on a real case 
study, namely the seismic probabilistic assessment of the functional performance (in 
terms of flows, connectivity loss and power loss) of the medium-high transmission 
network in Sicily region [12]. To achieve the goal of creating a user-friendly and 
ready available DSS to be used by Electric power network (EPN) asset managers, 
local authorities and civil protection departments, this paper proposes an ad-hoc cus-
tomization of a recently created DSS, namely CIPCast, which enables to operationally 
perform risk prediction on Critical Infrastructures (CI) for different kind of natural 
hazards, including earthquakes. In particular, building on the available international 
literature, this paper proposes models and metrics to be integrated within the different 
functional blocks that constitute CIPCast (Fig. 1) to allow for the seismic risk analysis 
and management of electric power networks.  
2 CIPCast Decision Support System  
CI protection is a major issue for Nations, due to its transnational relevance. EU has 
thus issued directives to Member States in favour of an increased level of protection, 
recognizing the fact that CI constitute a unique, large system covering all the EU area 
[13]. In support of these EU directives, the APIC Lab1 of ENEA has targeted the de-
velopment and implementation of a DSS specific for CI protection, referred to as 
CIPCast. CIPCast was conceived and developed in the framework of two different 
projects, namely the EU-funded project “CIPRNet” (Critical Infrastructures Prepar-
edness and Resilience Research Network) and the project “RoMA” (Resilience en-
hancement of a Metropolitan Area), funded by MIUR (the Italian Ministry of Re-
search) as part of the research call “Smart Cities and Communities”. 
Making reference to simulated or real hazard scenarios, CIPCast DSS, can predict 
“Damage Scenarios” in term of punctual damages to the different CI components and 
“Impact Scenarios”, where services outages induced by the physical damage to CI 
[14] components, are assessed at micro- (local scale) or meso- (regional scale) level. 
Finally CIPCast can estimate “Consequences Scenarios”, starting from Impact Sce-
narios and via a consequences analysis, in term of estimated consequences on the 
affected communities (https://www.ciprnet.eu/ads.html).  
CIPCast was conceived as a combination of free/open source software environ-
ments [15] including Geographic Information System, GIS features, which play a 
                                                          
1  Laboratory for the Analysis and Protection of Critical Infrastructures 
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major role in the construction of such a tool. In the last few years, the geo-scientific 
community has been focusing on the use of GIS technologies and techniques for sup-
porting natural disaster early warning and emergency management tasks. Multi-
source data and GIS-integrated analysis can contribute to a better emergency plan-
ning, providing fundamental information for immediate response [16, 17]. The devel-
oped CIPCast DSS is capable to provide a user-friendly geographical user interface 
(GUI), by means of a specific WebGIS application, for querying and analysing geo-
graphic data and thematic maps, execute processes and simulations, produce and 
evaluate scenarios, etc. The creation of this information consultation tool, enriched by 
the geospatial component, implies the adoption of specific and suitable GIS and SDI 
(Spatial Data Infrastructures) architectures that have been developed using free/open 
source (FOSS) packages [18–20]. 
A specific Earthquake Simulator module for CIPCast (hereafter named CIPCast-
ES) was developed and customised to assess the earthquake-induced damage to the 
building stock, at census tract and single building level, and the relative expected 
consequences on the residents in term of casualties and displaced population. CIP-
Cast-ES allows working on a deterministic base, simulating damage and impact sce-
narios for selected earthquakes defined by the end-users, or for real events. In the first 
case CIPCast can support mitigation and preparedness planning; in the latter case 
CIPCast can inform emergency management allowing for testing alternative strategies 
and resource allocations. The possibility to account for the seismic microzonation (i.e. 
the possible amplification of the seismic hazard and therefore of the expected impacts 
due to soil conditions) was also included within CIPCast-ES, and was used for the 
case study of Florence Municipality, where a seismic microzonation study, providing 
the-specific amplification factor AF was provided [21].  
3 Methods and Data 
Different steps are necessary for estimating earthquake-induced damage, functional 
impacts and restoration timeframe for distributed infrastructures [22, 23], summarised 
below as: 
1. Hazard assessment: generation of ground shaking and ground deformation maps 
and selection of the most appropriate earthquake hazard parameters to describe them;  
2. Classification of infrastructure components: inventory and classification of the 
infrastructure components according to a defined taxonomy, so that the elements ex-
pected to behave similarly, by sustaining similar damages when subjected to an earth-
quake event, can be grouped together;  
3. Physical damage and functional impact metrics: selection of appropriate scales 
for classifying earthquake induced physical damage to each component (e.g. for 
above-ground components: structural and non-structural damage to the building hous-
ing the component and damage to the equipment) and the residual operability of the 
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Table 1. CIPCast functional blocks and proposed steps for building capacity within CIPCast-
ES for estimating earthquake-induced risk to electric power networks. 
CIPCast  
functional blocks CIPCast-ES – Electric power networks  
B1 1. Seismic Hazard representation  
B3 
 
2. Classification of infrastructure        
3. Damage metrics at component level 
4. Damage assessment: physical and operational at compo-
nent level 
B4 5. System performance assessment*  
B5 6. Service restoration assessment*  
*Already built into CIPCast-ES 
3.1 Seismic Hazard representation   
In order to evaluate the performance of a distributed infrastructure system after an 
earthquake, it is necessary to know the damage state and functionality at each compo-
nent simultaneously and hence also the ground motion at each site simultaneously. A 
brief overview is provided on how to possibly assess and represent seismic hazard 
within CIP-Cast ES for distributed infrastructures, including: 1) description of the 
ground shaking in terms of Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) and Peak Ground Ve-
locity (PGV) at bedrock; 2) representation of amplification due to peculiar soil condi-
tions; 3) estimation of ground deformation (PGD), and Liquefaction Potential Index, 
(LPI); 4) possible representation of uncertainties. A complete argument on the subject 
is out of the scope of the paper and can be found , e.g. in [26].  
Description of ground shaking in term of PGA and PGV - CIPCast-ES allows the 
performance of deterministic seismic hazard analysis, for both real events and for 
end-user defined events. In the first case, and as far as the Italian territory is con-
cerned, CIPCast-ES receives, within 1 min from the occurrence of the earthquake, the 
GPS coordinates of the earthquake epicentre, the hypocentre depth and the measured 
Moment Magnitude MW (Richter scale) from the Italian National Institute of Geo-
physics and Volcanology, INGV, in Italy (http://cnt.rm.ingv.it/). A shake map is then 
generated using a suite of ground motion prediction equations (GMPEs). Currently 
CIPCast-ES implements Sabetta and Pugliese GMPE [27] in terms of PGA and dif-
ferent GMPEs in terms of Macroseismic Intensity I [21]. The seismic performance of 
above ground components of electric power networks, such as substations, can be 
assessed against PGA. However buried components such as cables would need to be 
assessed against Peak ground Velocity (PGV). Further attenuation laws will need to 
be included within CIPCast-ES to allow for that.  
Representation of soil amplifications - After the prediction of the ground shaking 
either in term of PGA or PGV, possible site amplification due to soil condition would 
need to be accounted for. CIPCast-ES allows doing so, if a map of amplification fac-
tor AF (describing the ratio between the spectral acceleration Sa of the ground motion 
at the ground surface and at the bedrock) is provided. Further potentialities will be 
built within CIPCast-ES to allow for modelling site amplification directly within the 
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selected GMPE itself, or simply by inputting the site class and/or a share wave veloci-
ty 0-30-meters depth (Vs30) value for each site in the ground motion field.  
Estimation of PGD and LPI  - The possibility to estimate PGD, conditional upon 
the intensity of the estimated ground shaking, should be also included within CIP-
Cast-ES as PGD proved to be an issue for both above ground and buried components 
of electric power networks. Principal causes of PGD [28] will be estimated in CIP-
Cast-ES as follow: a) coseismic fault displacement in the near-fault area will be calcu-
lated via semi-empirical correlations as a function of the earthquake magnitude (e.g. 
the ones available from Petersen et al., 2011); b) landslides triggered by seismic shak-
ing [29] - this capability will be included in CIPCast-ES as discussed in the Conclu-
sion section of this paper); c) liquefaction, lateral spreading, and seismic settlement 
will be estimated in term of liquefaction potential index (LPI) that proved to be a 
good predictor for the damages induced on buried cables [30].  
Representation of uncertainties - GMPEs are derived empirically, further to the de-
terministic part, which calculates the median value of ground motion, GMPEs include 
random variables representing the variability that occurs within a single event (intra-
event) and between separate events (inter-event) [31]. For analysis of spatially dis-
tributed systems the requirement for simultaneous ground motions at multiple sites 
means that the ground motions must be spatially correlated. For the sake of computa-
tional efficiency, straightforward approaches for obtaining correlated ground motion 
fields in CIPCast-ES, will be preferred to complex geostatistical methods [26]. 
3.2 Classification of infrastructure components  
The purpose of classifying infrastructure into taxonomy is to group together elements 
that can be expected to behave similarly following an earthquake. Classification of 
infrastructure systems require firstly the identification of the different components 
included in the system and secondly the identification of the typologies/characteristics 
of the different components. 
An electric power network may comprise different components: generation plants, 
substations and related sub-components, transmission lines (Table 2). Each of these 
serves a different function in the system. Generation plants are responsible for pro-
duction of electric power; transmission lines transport the electricity from one loca-
tion to another; substations, supply the power at load/consumer end. The sub-stations 
have different components, namely: transformers (usually step-down) to change the 
voltage level to a standard distribution level voltage; feeders connect the consum-
er/load end with the substation (with respect to a distribution system/substation); the 
terminal substation of each feeder ends with a switch. For each of the aforementioned 
components and sub-components there are different typologies, relating to structural 
or operational attributes. Transmission lines, for example, can vary based on their 
position (overhead lines or underground cables), their insulation material or their size. 
Substations may vary by load capacity or voltage2. Table 2 shows the assumed infra-
                                                          
2  Primary Substations (PS) contain High Voltage (HV) to Medium Voltage (MV) transform-
ers; Secondary Substations (SS), Medium Voltage (MV) to Low Voltage (LV) transformers. 
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structure taxonomy for this work, their key constituent components and component 
attributes. The component attributes are the descriptors that could be used to group 
components into distinct typologies. Components can sometimes be pieces of equip-
ment housed inside a building. In this case the attribute ‘seismic design level’ refers to 
whether the building is seismically designed or whether the component is anchored. 
Sometimes components are made up of a systemic arrangement of smaller sub-
components. In this case ‘seismic design level’ refers to whether or not these sub-
components are anchored.  
Table 2. Example of infrastructure system taxonomy for electric power network. 
Components  Attributes Graph  Damage Metric 
Generation plants  Capacity, seismic design level Node  Damage level  
Substations  Voltage, seismic de-sign level Node Damage level 
Transmission Lines 
Cables Insulation Material,  Cable material, Size Edge Repair Rate 
Overhead 
Lines Material  Edge Repair rate 
 
An inventory is an enumeration of the components and facilities in each of the ty-
pologies considered by the assumed taxonomy. Preparation of an inventory for infra-
structure can be difficult since attributes cannot be identified by simple visual inspec-
tion and in many cases the components are not visible (e.g. buried lines). The invento-
ry should therefore be prepared by collecting data from available sources. In the case 
of infrastructure however usually the only source is the system operator. To protect 
commercial interests and due to concerns over security, this type of information is not 
usually available in the public domain to a high level of detail and so depending on 
the granularity of the modelling exercise, it may be necessary to work in partnership 
with infrastructure owners [32]. It is quite critical to know the geographical location 
of each component. Availability of GIS layers of the entire network would be ideal: 
for instance, within CIPCast development, this has been possible in the framework of 
“RoMA” project, thanks to the partnership and cooperation of ACEA Distribuzione 
SpA – Areti, the major electrical distribution operator in Lazio Region (Italy). 
3.3 Damage metrics at component level 
The damage scales used to model infrastructure damage vary depending on the type 
of component being assessed. All networked infrastructures can be represented as an 
arrangement of ‘point’ components, also known as nodes and linear components, also 
known as edges, e.g. for an electric power transmission system represented diagram-
matically as a network, the generation plant and substations are nodes and the over-
head lines and buried cables are edges (Table 2). 
Damage to infrastructure nodes can be described either in terms of physical dam-
age or operational failure. Where components are housed inside buildings, it may be 
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necessary to separately assess the operational state of the equipment and physical 
damage to the building. For infrastructure components housed in buildings, it is pos-
sible for the structure to be significantly damaged yet the component is fully opera-
tional as none of the equipment is damaged. Conversely, it is possible for the structure 
to be sound yet the component does not function because equipment inside has been 
damaged. The HAZUS methodology [6] considers both generation plants and substa-
tions (Table 3) as nodes of the electric power network classifying them in term of 
power output and voltage respectively and distinguishing, furthermore, whether or not 
their components are anchored (i.e. designed with special seismic tiedowns or tie-
backs) or unanchored (i.e. designed according to normal requirements). Four damage 
states are defined for generation plants and substations, i.e.: slight/minor damage, 
moderate damage, extensive damage and complete damage (Table 3). In this applica-
tion, the damage scale proposed for the building housing sub-stations is the 5 level 
damage scale defined by the European Macroseismic Scale, EMS-98 [33] already 
used by CIPCast-ES.  




Minor * Moderate Extensive Complete 
Disconnect switches  5%*  40% 70% 100% 
Switches  5%  40% 70% 100% 
Current transformers  - 40% 70% 100% 
Transformers  - - 70% 1000% 
Building**  D1-D2 D3 D4 D5 
*“Failure of 5% of disconnect switches or failure of 5% of circuit breakers or building being in 
D1-D2 damage state”; **EMS-98 (Gruntal 1998) damage levels.
 
While damage to infrastructure nodes is usually classified qualitatively, damage to 
infrastructure edges can be assessed quantitatively in term of repair rate. The repair 
rate, RR, is a deterministic calculation of the number of damages that a cable is ex-
pected to experience per unit of length, usually per kilometre. The relationship be-
tween repair rate and earthquake hazard commonly follows a power law or a linear 
relationship although more complex functions do exist. Most repair rate functions 
have been derived empirically. The typical form of a power law repair rate function is 
shown in Eq. 1, and a corresponding linear relationship is shown in Eq. 2: 
 ܴܴ = ܽ ∙ ܫܯ௕ (1) 
 ݈ܴܴ݊ = ܿ ∙ ݈݊IM + d (2) 
where RR is the repair rate, IM is the earthquake hazard parameter and a, b, c, d are 
coefficients determined using some regression technique [34]. To account for differ-
ent material properties or soil conditions, the repair rate function may include addi-
tional multiplying factors, which vary according to attribute, or a set of functions may 
be proposed for different conditions. 
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3.4 Damage assessment at component level 
Fragility curves for generation plants and sub-stations. Fragility functions are 
used to evaluate earthquake-induced damage to generation plants and sub-stations of 
electric power network. For a given level of ground motion intensity, fragility func-
tions determine the probability that a structure or component will be in, or exceeded, 
the ith damage state, Dsi. Fragility functions are often described by a lognormal proba-
bility distribution function as in Eq. 3, although it is noted that this distribution may 
not always be the best fit: 
 ௙ܲ൫ܦ௦ ≥ ܦ௦೔หܫܯ൯ = Φ ቂ
ଵ




where Pf(·) indicates the probability of being at or exceeding a particular damage 
state, Dsi, for a given seismic intensity level defined by an earthquake intensity meas-
ure, IM (e.g. PGA, PGV, PGD etc.), Φ is the standard cumulative probability func-
tion, IMmi is the median threshold value of the earthquake intensity measure IM re-
quired to cause the ith damage state and β is the total standard deviation. According to 
Eq. 3, fragility curves can be therefore drawn providing the values of the two parame-
ters, IMmi and β, as a function of IM. Cavalieri et al. [11, 35] provided an exhaustive 
overview on the main recent works on fragility functions for electric power system 
components along with the defining IMmi and β parameters for each one of them. Ta-
ble 4 provides, as an example IMmi and β parameters for substations, as defined by 
HAZUS [6], making reference to empirical data/expert judgments and using Boolean 
logic and probabilistic combination of damage functions for jointly accounting for the 
performance of the constituting sub-components (listed in Table 3).  
Differently from HAZUS, SYNER-G methodology [11] provides fragility func-
tions for individual sub-components identifying all potential failure modes for the 
whole substation. As such, it is possible to determine the failure probability of the 
substation using fault tree analysis, where ‘failure’ refers to the substation’s ability to 
distribute power rather than a physical damage state. SYNER-G fragility functions 
have been adapted from the work of Vanzi [36], specifically referring to Italian sub-
stations. Kongar et al. [32] reality-checked the reliability of both the aforementioned 
approaches comparing the damage predicted for substation with the ones observed 
after the Canterbury earthquake sequence 2010-2011. Both the approaches overesti-
mated the damage and the loss of functionality. The adoption and implementation of 
either one or the other approach within CIPCast-ES will need to be carefully calibrat-
ed as discussed in the conclusions.  
Repair rate relationship for buried cables. Kongar et al. [30] produced for the first 
time evidence-based repair rates for the prediction of damage to buried cables, pro-
cessing and analysing the damaged caused to them by 2010-2011 Canterbury, New 
Zealand, earthquake sequence. The analysis showed that the fragility of buried cables 
is influenced more by liquefaction than by ground shaking, and that lateral spread can 
cause more damage than settlement alone. Kongar et al. [30] distinguished four dif-
ferent earthquake-induced geotechnical hazard zones (Table 4). Along with the typol-
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ogy of hazard and its intensity, the insulation material was identified as a critical fac-
tor influencing cable fragility. In Christchurch three materials were used for the insu-
lation of 11 kV cables, namely: paper-insulated lead covered armoured (PILCA); 
cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE); and PILCA cables reinforced with high-density 
polyethylene (PILCA HDPE); plus some further unknown materials (Other). After the 
Canterbury earthquake sequence repair rates in PILCA cables resulted considerably 
higher than those observed in XLPE cables [30].  
Table 4. Fragility function parameters for macro-components. 
Damage  
State 
Low Voltage Medium voltage High Voltage 
U A U A U A 
Slight 
/Minor 
IM* β IM β IM β IM β IM β IM β 
0.13 0.65 0.15 0.70 0.10 0.60 0.15 0.60 0.09 0.50 0.11 0.50 
Moderate 0.26 0.50 0.29 0.55 0.20 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.13 0.40 0.15 0.45 
Extensive 0.34 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.30 0.40 0.35 0.40 0.17 0.35 0.20 0.35 
Complete 0.74 0.40 0.9 0.45 0.50 0.40 0.70 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.47 0.40 
*IM is IMmi as defined in Eq. 3, expressed in PGA[g] 
** Low (34.5 kV to 150 kV), Medium (150 kV to 350 kV), High (350 kV and above) 
 
Conversely, Kongar et al. [30] analysis showed no trend between cable age and re-
pair rates and a non-significant difference in repair rates for different conducting ma-
terials (conducting materials used in Christchurch included copper and aluminium). 
Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. shows the repair rate function 
[30] that will be built into CIPCast-ES: repair rate functions refer to PILCA cables; 
coefficients are proposed to modify the ‘base’ PILCA functions for other materials. 
Therefore to estimate the repair rate for typologies, other than PILCA, one can calcu-
late the repair rate for PILCA cables first and then multiply by the corresponding 
coefficient in Table 4. 
Table 5.  Repair rate function for PILCA cables, for different earthquake-induced geotechnical 
hazard zones, and coefficients for alternative insulation material typologies. 
Earthquake-induced geotechnical 
hazard Zones 




PILCA XLPE PILCA HDPE Other 
A - No Liquefaction - * 0.06 0.38 1.31 
B - All Liquefaction RR=4.317PGD-0.324 0.26 0.82 1.07 
C - Liquefaction with settlement only RR=1.23PGD 0.31 0.67 1.48 
D - Liquefaction with lateral spread-
ing RR=7.951PGD+0.18 0.14 1.75 0.00 
*No reliable relationship 
3.5 System performance assessment according to CIPCast-RecSIM  
There are two paradigms for measuring system performance: connectivity analysis 
and serviceability analysis. Connectivity analysis determines whether two points in 
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The “Consequences Analysis” module (see B4 in Fig. 1) can produce furthermore 
a more “societal-oriented” assessment of the impacts [37] by estimating the reduction 
of wellbeing for different societal sectors (e.g. citizens, economic activities, public 
services etc.) and the social and economic costs caused by the unavailability (or par-
tial availability) of primary services such as electricity, telecommunications, drinkable 
water, mobility etc.. Further to the models already built into CIPCast-RecSIM for this 
societal-oriented impact assessment [25] other relationships will be added to assess 
the expected impacts on businesses of different industry sectors as a function of the 
outages duration for the electric power service [38].      
3.6 CIPCast-RecSIM: Service restoration assessment  
The purpose of restoration functions is to evaluate the time that it might take for dam-
aged infrastructure components to be repaired based on their damage state and/or the 
average percentage of repairs that might take place within a specified time period 
[39]. Such functions may be derived empirically or estimated via resource modelling 
as a function of the available resources and work rate. CIPCast B5, by means of Rec-
SIM, can evaluate the repair times at component-level and after that re-evaluate the 
system performance metrics at time-steps after the earthquake accounting for im-
proved system conditions. Towards that CIPCast-RecSIM can simulate the basic 
functioning mechanisms of a switched and controllable electrical network, while ac-
counting for the procedures usually performed in case of failure and the restoration 
functions for the different components, the number of emergency crews and power 
generators available to the electric operator. CIPCast B5 aims at informing CI opera-
tors and emergency managers on appropriate intervention, mitigation, and recovery 
strategies. At the current stage of development, the support actions are mainly related 
to the optimization of the system recovery sequence, in order to minimize the crisis 
impact on the continuity, measured in term of kmin, as defined in Eq. 3. 
4 Conclusions 
The paper demonstrated the feasibility and value of developing an ad-hoc DSS for 
assessing and mitigating the seismic risk to electric power network. The authors are 
collaboratively working on the steps described in the paper and on testing the reliabil-
ity of the proposed models on real cases in Europe, including the recent earthquake 
sequence in Central Italy, where the network data are available thanks to the coopera-
tion of ACEA. The CIPCast-ES will allow end-users to perform the assessment of 
possible earthquake-induced impacts on the overall system  (accounting also for in-
terdependencies) [40] and to estimate the possible consequences on citizens and on 
environment, starting from both real data (acquired by distributed sensors and moni-
toring networks), and from the elaboration of simulated scenarios.   
As future developments, CIPCast will be further enhanced with additional func-
tionality, primarily the use of Earth Observation data to improve the territorial analy-
sis, particularly considering the landslide risk [29]. Secondly the integration of addi-
Sonia Giovinazzi et al. 
tional data for environmental monitoring, and finally the capability of collecting 
crowdsourced data (e.g., real-time road traffic conditions), allowing the citizens to 
provide useful information to be exploited by the Public Authorities for improving the 
situational awareness in Metropolitan areas.  In turn, the availability of a huge amount 
of data stored and processed within CIPCast will allow the Authorities to provide to 
the CP, the CI Operators and the citizens effective information in real time, therefore 
improving the decision processes for crisis and emergencies management. 
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